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 Abstract 
 
The European Council called for a period of reflection in each of the member states of the 
European Union (EU) after the people of France and the Netherlands rejected the 
Constitutional Treaty in referendums in 2005. The present paper offers a contribution to 
this process by reflecting on the prospects for institutional design and redesign in the EU. It 
does so from a historical perspective, and the paper discusses what lessons can be drawn 
from Jean Monnet, viewed as an institutional designer on the European stage. It is argued 
that the successful establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ESCS) was a 
product of a robust deontological design in a constitutional moment for Europe, and that 
prospective designers in the EU can learn important lessons from how Monnet identified 
and exploited available spaces for institutional design.  
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  21. Introduction 
 
The overriding theme of this paper is deliberate political design, and the main objective is 
to make a contribution towards understanding why some political design attempts turn out 
more successful than others. The interest in this topic stems from a well-known puzzle in 
politics; while democratic governance is based on the fundamental idea that social and 
political life can be shaped purposefully, it is often observed that comprehensive reforms 
can be difficult to carry out in practice (March and Simon, 1958; March and Olsen, 1989; 
1995). This paper addresses this puzzle by analysing a particularly successful attempt at 
radical deliberate political design, and discusses what lessons can be drawn from it for 
prospective designers.     
 
As a point of departure for his theoretical discussions on design and redesign of political 
institutions, Johan P. Olsen poses two questions (Olsen, 1997: 203). First, to what degree 
do democratic contexts create a viable space for institutional design – making design 
necessary, politically feasible and legitimate? Second, what kinds of processes tend to make 
designers able to exploit the available space of design? This paper considers these two 
questions in the context of the European Union (EU), where focus is on the space and role 
of deliberate political design during the early European integration efforts after World War 
II.  
 
The establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) through the 1951 
Treaty of Paris ignited what is often considered to be the most remarkable international 
  3political integration project the world has witnessed. The process of institution-building, 
law-making, policy integration and market creation in the EU has produced a model of 
internationalization with distinct characteristics (Laffan, 1998).  However, the future of this 
project and model is now more uncertain, as a widespread sense of crisis has engulfed the 
EU after the people of France and the Netherlands rejected the Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe (the Constitutional Treaty) in referendums in 2005. In light of these 
results, the European Council called for a period of reflection in each of the EU member 
states. The present paper offers a contribution to this process by reflecting on the prospects 
for institutional design and redesign in the EU. It does so from a historical perspective in 
order to avoid the “myopic theories based solely on the most recent developments” (Olsen, 
2003: 835). Although the size and heterogeneity of the European integration project has 
increased substantially, potential lessons for the current constitutionalization process will 
be drawn from the successful establishment of the ESCS. A historical perspective is further 
justified by the fact that the current institutions of the EU are remarkably similar to those 
designed in the early1950s (Pinder, 1985-86). 
 
A beloved child has many names as they say in the Scandinavian countries, and Jean 
Monnet has been recognized, among other things, as the architect and master builder (Ball, 
1978), the creator and instigator (Yergin and Stanislaw, 1998), the entrepreneur and planner 
(Ardagh, 1968) and the innovator and trail-blazer (Rostow, 1994) for European post-war 
unity. Each of these characterizations entails references to the phenomenon of deliberate 
political design, and this paper takes an in-depth look at Monnet as an institutional 
designer. Monnet referred to his political vision and project in terms of “a European grand 
  4design” (Monnet, 1978: 465) or “un vaste dessein européen” (Monnet, 1976: 546), and the 
discussions draw heavily on Monnet’s own views and experiences with deliberate political 
design at the supra-national level, as they are expressed in his Memoirs (Monnet, 1976; 
1978).
1 This book has been referred to as a handbook “on how to get constructive things 
done in a world where governments still claim sovereignty, and bureaucrats ardently defend 
their turf and the status quo” (Rostow, 1994: 258). Aware of the potential pitfalls associated 
with evoking the “dead kings” in the contemporary EU debate (Petersson and Hellströrm, 
2003), this paper discusses what lessons can be drawn from the role of Jean Monnet in the 
establishment of the ECSC for prospective designers at the EU level. Responding to the 
appeal for more theoretically and methodologically rigorous evaluations of the role of 
entrepreneurship in studies of the EU (Moravcsik, 1999), a set of concrete hypotheses 
concerning the role of design will be empirically tested.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: Part 2 presents the concept of deliberate political design 
in greater detail, and seeks to identify circumstances and factors that may affect available 
spaces for institutional design, as well as prospective designers’ abilities to exploit these 
spaces. Distinctions between two types of political contexts and two types of political 
designs are made and presented. Further, the discussions on political design at the EU level 
                                                 
1 Jean Monnet’s Memoirs was written with assistance  of the writer François Fontaine 
(Monnet, 1976), and it was translated from French to English by Richard Mayne (Monnet , 
1978). An introduction by George W. Ball was included in the English version (Ball, 
1978).       
  5are linked to the established Europeanization literature. In Section 3, Jean Monnet is 
viewed and analyzed as an institutional designer, where focus is on the design context and 
process associated with the ESCS. Based on these discussions, Part 4 reflects on the space 
and role of design in connection with the Constitutional Treaty. Finally, Section 5 sums up 
and concludes.  
 
 
2. Designer Europeanization: Contexts and Processes   
 
This paper deals with the early post-war attempts at radical supra-national political design 
at the European level, and in light of these findings, discusses the prospects for deliberate 
institutional design in the EU today. Focus is on the dynamics and outcomes of EU level 
institutional development which can be referred to under the umbrella of Europeanization 
(Olsen, 2002).
2 The word “designer Europeanization” emphasises the deliberate aspects of 
these processes, where design is understood as purposeful and deliberate intervention that 
succeeds in establishing new institutional structures and processes, or rearranging existing 
ones, thereby achieving intended outcomes and improvements (Olsen, 1997: 205).
3 
Accordingly, political design is a dual exercise, as successful designers must be able to 
develop visions, as well as to enact the developed visions.  
                                                 
2 See Olsen (2002) and his discussion of five different accounts of Europeanization.  
3 The concept of “designer Europeanization” has earlier been used by Helen Wallace 
(2002: 144).   
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Although purposeful and deliberate interventions occasionally are successful, they are most 
often less than perfect, i.e. decisions to change do not lead to change, or they lead to further 
unanticipated and unintended change (March and Simon, 1958; March and Olsen, 1989; 
1995). Despite these imperfections, most governance models are premised on the ideal that 
elected visionary political leaders can move a polity in a desired direction. It is therefore 
imperative for both ordinary citizens and elected political leaders to increase our 
understanding about the conditions that may facilitate deliberate political design.  
 
Towards this aim, the foundation of the ECSC will be analysed in light of two dimensions; 
a contextual dimension that is assumed to affect the spaces for political design, and a 
procedural dimension that is assumed to affect the designers’ abilities to exploit the 
available spaces for design. First, we can separate between two contexts for political 
design, and they can be referred to as constitutional moments versus routine politics (Olsen, 
2003: 833). Constitutional moments as opposed to routine politics can be defined as “the 
rare moments in a nation’s history when deep, principled discussion transcends the 
logrolling and horse-trading of everyday majority politics” (Elster, 1988: 6). These 
moments can be produced by revolutions, social unrest, financial bankruptcy or some other 
serious performance crisis, or follow from external shocks such as war, conquest and defeat 
(Olsen, 1997). Routine processes of learning and adaptation are assumed to reduce the need 
for comprehensive reform (Olsen, 2003), and the hypothesis here is that available spaces 
for deliberate political design will be wider when states face constitutional moments than in 
contexts of routine politics and politics-as-usual. Although design processes are affected by 
  7timing, we do not assume a deterministic relation between design context and outcome. 
Despite its limitations, political leadership is relevant, and it is important to pay attention to 
how and with what effects political designers can influence and shape the objective context, 
as well as people’s perceptions of this context. For instance, convincing and mobilizing the 
right amount of participants (some, but not too many) around a constitutional moment may 
be a key to successful political and institutional design by preventing overcrowded 
“garbage can” processes that make it difficult to reach joint decisions on change (Cohen, 
March and Olsen, 1972). 
 
Second, concerning the question of what kinds of processes tend to make designers able to 
exploit the space of design, a distinction can be made between deontological designs and 
instrumental designs (Olsen, 1997: 220). A design based on instrumental principles focuses 
on the expected contributions to realize predetermined goals, and the immediate substantive 
results of these efforts. This type of design presupposes that all action alternatives, the 
probability distribution of consequences conditional of each alternative, and the subjective 
value of each possible consequence are known (March, 1999). Lack of exact knowledge 
constitutes a serious problem for instrumental designs. Deontological designs, on the other 
hand, are not assessed based on precise calculations of their effectiveness and efficiency in 
specific situations, instead, the question is whether they are seen as appropriate in coping 
with a broader class of tasks and situations (Olsen, 1997). Focus here is on long-term 
general principles rather than specific outcomes. Deontological designs, therefore, 
acknowledge and embrace the uncertainties and ambiguities associated with decision-
making. Gibson and Goodin (1999), for instance, see vagueness as a model for institutional 
  8design. They argue that agreements on reforms are easier to achieve when they are wrapped 
in a “veil of vagueness” that can cloak the actual nature of an agreement and in that way 
make the process more acceptable to all concerned. A key hypothesis here is that it will be 
easier to build support for robust deontological designs that refer to basic principles that 
constrain political processes in somewhat uncertain and ambiguous ways and allow 
different substantive outcomes, than for instrumental designs that dictate precise policy 
outcomes (Olsen, 1997).  
 
 
3. The European Coal and Steel Community: A Deontological Design in a 
Constitutional Moment for Europe  
 
Across the centuries, many attempts at creating a more politically integrated Europe have 
been made. Among all those initiatives, the Treaty of Paris establishing the ESCS stands 
out as a remarkably successful case of deliberate political design. This radical new project 
received almost immediate preliminary approval by the 6 participating states, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The formal negotiations started 
two months after the idea had been presented for the first time in May 1950. The final 
treaty was signed in April 1951, less than a year after the formal negotiations had 
commenced. The ESCS entered into force in August 1952 after having been ratified by the 
national parliaments of the 6 member states. Although Jean Monnet worked closely with 
other people in this process, he is, in this paper, studied as the main designer of the ESCS 
  9project, and his views on contexts and procedures associated with successful political and 
institutional design will be presented and discussed.  
 
The underlying context leading up to the Treaty of Paris can be described in terms of a 
constitutional moment in European politics. After WW II, there was a widespread feeling 
that Europe needed to undertake concrete plans to avoid future armed conflicts through 
other strategies than what had been used in the League of Nations. This popular and 
political mood gave rise in late 1940s to the European movement, which has been described 
as a loose collection of individuals and interest groups ranged across the political spectrum 
that shared the advocacy of European unity (Dinan, 1999). However, there was little 
agreement on what principles future European co-operation and unity should be based, and 
a clear split could be observed between the “unionist” and the more radical “federalist” 
position.  
 
Jean Monnet, who was the head of the French Commissariat Général du Plan, was an 
outsider and observer to the European movement. He had come to the conclusion during 
WW II that economic integration was the only means by which a future conflict in Europe 
could be avoided. It was this realization that stimulated his 1943 vision of the formation of 
“a federation or a European entity” among the states of Europe (Monnet, 1978: 222).
4 
                                                 
4 In a letter written to the Committee of National Liberation in Algiers on August 15, 1943, 
Monnet argues that “…the states of Europe must form a form a federation or a “European 
entity” which will make them a single economic unit”.  
  10Concerning the enactment of this vision, Monnet stressed the importance of patience and 
timing. It is clear that Monnet felt that WW II had the potential of producing a 
constitutional moment and a space for deliberate political design at the supra-national level 
in Europe. However, he did not think that the destructiveness of WW II was serious enough 
to “trigger a political reaction of the kind that would cause European countries to pool their 
sovereignty in a unique, supranational entity” (Dinan, 1999).
5 He therefore continued to 
prepare and work on his grand design in a context of routine politics, while he was waiting 
for the constitutional moment when his vision could be presented and sought enacted. “The 
essential thing is to be prepared. For that, I need a firm belief, based on long reflection. 
When the moment comes, everything is simple, because necessity leaves no room for 
hesitation” (Monnet, 1978: 35). As emphasised by Rostow (1994: 265), there are several 
explicit references in the Memoirs to the critical importance of timing in the designing of 
political institutions, and Monnet claimed that only the “pressure of necessity” would 
produce a constitutional moment for European unity.  
 
In connection with the German industrial recovery and the gradual softening of British and 
U.S. occupation polices towards the end of the 1940s, it became increasingly evident that 
the harsh and punitive French policies towards Germany had become outdated and were in 
need of a fundamental revision. This feeling was further exacerbated by the establishment 
of the Federal Republic of West Germany in September 1949. In this context, Monnet was 
                                                 
5 Monnet openly states that he had expected to see more material destructions when he 
returned to France from exile in 1945 (1978: 225).  
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come to act” (1978: 287). However, faced with a multitude of participants, problems and 
solutions concerning the future of Europe after WWII, Monnet was aware of the fact that 
specific stimulus and political leadership was necessary in order to transform a disposition 
for change into his preferred option for institutional reform. Monnet believed that France’s, 
and the wider Europe’s, economic and security interests could be best ensured through 
Franco-German reconciliation, and on April 28 1950, Monnet sent his vision of a 
supranational coal and steel community to the French Prime Minister, Georges Bidault and 
the Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman. At that point, Monnet knew that the Americans had 
asked the French to propose the broad lines of a German policy on behalf of the three 
Western occupying forces at the Foreign Ministers’ meeting in London on May 11-13, 
1950.  
 
Concerning the contextual dimension of Monnet’s supranational design project, the ESCS 
was a product of a vision developed over time in a context of routine politics. This vision 
was, in turn, presented and sought enacted in the context of a constitutional moment when 
the available space for institutional design was assumed wider. Organization of attention 
around what can be referred to as a constitutional moment was therefore a central aspect of 
Monnet’s political design project. “[A]lthough it takes a long time to reach the men at the 
top, it takes little to explain to them how to escape from the difficulties of the present. This 
is something they are glad to hear when the critical moment comes. Then, when ideas are 
lacking, they accept yours with gratitude” (Monnet, 1978: 231). Monnet’s proposal was 
  12picked up by Schuman, who in turn placed before his own cabinet and presented it to the 
German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer.  
 
A study of the political designer Jean Monnet illustrates the importance of patience in 
deliberate political and institutional design; i.e. waiting for the development of a space that 
makes design necessary, politically feasible and legitimate. Thus, the timing of the plan was 
“no accident at all” (Duchêne, 1994: 190). However, Monnet was not a passive observer in 
this process, as he actively sought to shape people’s perceptions of the context. In order to 
increase the chances of convincing enough people about the existence of a constitutional 
moment and to increase the space for institutional design, he seemed to stimulate the sense 
of crisis by being overly pessimistic and through over-dramatization of the situation.
6 As 
will be illustrated, Monnet also had a clear opinion on how the space for institutional 
design should be successfully exploited. Focus here is on how Monnet used and embraced 
ambiguity in the designing of the ESCS. 
                                                 
6 Duchêne (1994) illustrates Monnet’s overly pessimistic and dramatic attitude in 1950 
through a number of quotes. For instance, Monnet claimed that the cold war was the first 
stage in the preparation of war. Further, he told a visitor when asked about how things were 
going: “Badly my friend…They are going to drop it, the atom bomb, and then…” 
(Duchêne, 1994: 198). According to Duchêne, Monnet continued to rely on this strategy as 
President of the High Authority of the ESCS, as he created an “atmosphere of permanent 
crisis” which was used to generate what is referred to as  “creative tensions”  (Duchêne, 
1994: 240) 
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After having received the politicians’ attention, and the acceptance from France, Germany 
and the U.S., Monnet aimed to stabilize the attention that had been produced through the 
constitutional moment. Already before the Monnet Proposal was presented to the French 
government, Jean Monnet worked on institutionalizing the attention and the idea: “pleased 
as I was, I knew that the essential task remained to be completed; and I was impatient for 
one thing – institutions to give shape to an agreement based on goodwill. Nothing is 
possible without men: nothing is lasting without institutions (Monnet, 1978: 304-05). 
Monnet had at an early stage been clear that supranational institutions would be needed to 
enact his vision. Repetition was another method used to stabilize attention around his 
vision. Monnet was famous for his repetition of central messages, and always the same 
message, no matter who he talked with.
7 “There are many advantages in getting the same 
formulae fixed in people’s minds” (Monnet, 1978: 126). 
 
The Monnet vision for European unity had an overriding political and moral purpose, and 
as will be illustrated, he relied on a robust deontological design in order to achieve the 
widest possible acceptance for this vision. The basic principles of reason and morality 
behind Monnet’s vision of a unified Europe are summed up in the following sentence from 
the Monnet Plan, which was officially presented as the Schuman Declaration on 9 May 
1950:  “By the pooling of basic production and the establishment of a new High Authority 
                                                 
7 According to Rostow, Monnet explicitly made “repetition a principle and a weapon” 
(1994: 264).    
  14whose decisions will be binding on France, Germany, and the countries that join them, this 
proposal lay the first concrete foundations of the European Federation which is 
indispensable to the maintenance of peace” (my emphasis) (Monnet, 1978: 298).
8  
 
In realizing this general vision, Monnet embraced uncertainties and ambiguities, and 
discussions of details were either avoided or wrapped in a “veil of vagueness”. There are 
many examples of this. First, political details concerning the vision of European unity were 
absent when Monnet first presented the plan to Adenauer: “The aim of the French proposal, 
therefore, is essentially political. It even has an aspect which might be called moral. 
Fundamentally, it has one simple objective, which our Government will try to attain 
without worrying, in this first phase, about any technical difficulties that may arise” 
(Monnet, 1978: 310). According to Monnet, Adenauer welcomed the vision, and responded 
that: “we shall not let ourselves be caught up in details” (Monnet, 1978: 310). The political 
details were still unspecified when Schuman officially presented the plan. The future of the 
plan is like “a leap in the dark” as he sincerely told the journalists immediately after his 
presentation (Monnet, 1978: 305). Monnet could not blame Schuman for his lack of an 
informative response because: “Few people realized how true the metaphor was” (Monnet, 
1978: 305). The former British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, also realized this, and 
he referred to the Schuman plan as “a plan to have a plan” (Duchêne, 1994: 209). Second, 
                                                 
8 This quote is from Monnet’s Plan as it was presented to the French government in April 
1950. This proposal was presented by Schuman on 9 May 1950 with only minor 
modifications.  
  15even the economic details had not been included in the planning of the ECSC project, and 
the Monnet proposal was presented without a detailed examination of the relative costs to 
French and German coal and steel industries (Lynch, 1988). Third, Monnet also actively 
tried to avoid technical discussions over the institutional configuration of the ECSC, and in 
particular with regard to the role of the High Authority in the formal negotiations between 
the 6 countries after the initial plan had been approved. “My colleagues wanted these 
technical clauses settled beforehand: I should have liked to deal with them afterwards” 
(Monnet, 1978: 325). What Monnet wanted was to establish the institutions of the ECSC, 
and then let them work out all technical issues. Fourth, and in terms of personnel, Monnet 
actively tried to recruit generalists rather than technical experts to represents the 6 countries 
in the negotiations on the ECSC. As a direct response to Chancellor Adenauer’s request for 
advice on who should represent Germany in the negotiations, Monnet answered: “It would 
be a mistake to worry too much about expertise. What counts is a sense of general interest” 
(Monnet, 1978: 311). 
 
In short, Monnet did not rely on an instrumental design where all outcomes would be 
precisely dictated. ”I can say that at that time I was convinced that progress towards a 
united Europe would be easier if we could exclude from the new Treaty the legal and 
technical formalities that normally burden such agreements (Monnet, 1978: 321). It can be 
argued that Monnet vision for European unity was based on a robust deontological design 
with no blueprint of the final state. Although his vision of European unity was clear, he 
never assumed that it would be realized through a single general plan or comprehensive 
design. Instead, he thought his vision would be gradually realized through concrete, but 
  16more or less unspecified achievements. As emphasised by Gerber, “Monnet had produced a 
project that was both precise for the situation of coal and steel at the time, and potentially 
rich in future developments for Europe” (Gerbet, 1956: 552).  
 
A key to the successful establishment of the ECSC seems to be that Monnet managed to 
prevent the process from becoming a “garbage can” that makes joint decisions difficult due 
to an overload of participants, problems and solutions (Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972). 
Although he waited for the constitutional moment that would mobilize people, he 
intentionally tried to keep the number of participants down. Mobilizing some, but not too 
many seemed to be a guiding principle throughout the whole ECSS process. He preferred 
speed and secrecy in the planning phase, and only nine people were in the know of his plan 
the week before it was officially presented by Schuman on 9 May 1950 (Monnet, 1978: 
301).
9 Further, the number of participants in the 10 month long Schuman Plan Conference 
that commenced on 20 June 1950 counted not more than sixty delegates from the 6 
countries combined. The deontological design adopted by Monnet may have further 
contributed to reducing the number of participants. In fact, it was the deontological nature 
and the veil of vagueness surrounding the ESCS project that ultimately led to the British 
decision not to participate. The British government sought clarifications of central concepts 
in the French-German agreement, and refused the idea of committing themselves to pool 
resources and set up an authority with certain sovereign powers “before there had been full 
opportunity of considering how these important and far-reaching principles would work in 
                                                 
9 “I wanted to keep the idea as secret as possible” (Monnet, 1978: 294). 
  17practice” (Monnet, 1978:313). Acceptance of the ambiguous and unspecified principles 
underlying the ECSC project was of major importance for Monnet, and they were seen as 
“the entry ticket to the Schuman talks” (Duchêne, 1994: 202) . In fact, they were treated as 
the institutional building-blocks for European unity.   
 
The next section discusses the failure to ratify the 2004 Constitutional Treaty in light of 
Monnet’s deliberate political design project. It will be argued that the space for deliberate 
political design in the EU seemed more narrow, but also that the available space was less 
effectively exploited in connection with the constitutionalization process 50 years after the 
successful foundation of the ECSC.   
 
 
4. The 2004 Constitutional Treaty: An Instrumental Design in a (Temporary) 
Equilibrium in Europe? 
 
Monnet emphasised the element of patience in institutional design, and we have earlier seen 
how Jean Monnet waited for seven years before his 1943 vision for European unity was 
presented and acted upon. He waited for the constitutional moment that would create a 
space for deliberate political design. The context around the Constitutional Treaty seems 
different, as it was designed and sought ratified in a context of what has been referred to as 
a temporary equilibrium after a decade of institutional reform in the EU (Moravcsik, 2002; 
2006). Schmitter (2000) argues that, in this context, full-scale constitutionalization would 
be impossible because member states were not ready for a major overhaul of their ruling 
  18institutions. Constitution-making should be seen as a complex and multi-step process 
(Fossum and Menéndez, 2005). However, a lack of patience characterized the 
constitutionalization process, and the Constitutional Treaty was launched and sought 
ratified in a time when the available space for deliberate political design seemed very 
narrow.    
 
The ESCS design process was driven by a deontological design and what can be identified 
as “available, legitimate institutional building-blocks rather that substantive problems” 
(Olsen, 1997: 222). Jean Monnet studied the viability of alternative structures for achieving 
the vision of European unity, rather than aiming at tailor-made designs for achieving 
immediate policy goals. Focus was on long-term general principles rather than specific 
outcomes, ambiguities and uncertainties were embraced and veil of vagueness was used to 
generate the broadest possible support. The process associated with the Constitutional 
Treaty was different, and it was designed to realize a set of precise policy outcomes, i.e. 
making the EU more effective, more transparent, more comprehensible and closer to the 
European citizens (European Union, 2006). Constitutionalization was justified on the basis 
that the body of Community law as a whole, which was based on 8 existing treaties and 
more than 50 protocols and annexes, had made the “European structure more and more 
complex and very difficult for European citizens to understand” (European Union, 2006). 
Simplification and streamlining were therefore central aims associated with the 
Constitutional Treaty, as the designers tried to lift or remove the veil of vagueness 
surrounding the relationship between the basic institutions of the EU, their powers, their 
responsibilities and interrelations, as well as concerning the normative principles that the 
  19EU is based on. However, simplification and explanation of existing treaties and law is not 
unproblematic. As emphasised by the Swedish Prime Minister, the existing treaties are the 
result of delicate compromises, and simplification will be difficult without changing their 
content (Persson, 2001). The fundamental idea behind a deontological approach would 
have been to secure agreement on general principles on a broad level before going into 
more detailed discussions. However, this approach was not chosen, and there was even 
little agreement on whether the EU already had a constitution, whether it needed one, and if 
so, what kind of constitution was needed (Joerges et al., 2000). In short, the instrumental 
nature of the design did not seem to generate broad enough support to undertake radical 
treaty changes in the form of ratifying a Constitution for Europe.  The difference between 
the 1951 Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community and the 2004 Treaty 
Establishing a Constitution for Europe as design projects can be summed up in a simple 
two-by-two table.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Space for Institutional Design 
 
 
 
Constitutional 
Moment 
 
 
Routine 
Politics 
 
 
Deontological 
Design 
 
1951 
Treaty of Paris   
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Design 
 
 
Instrumental 
Design 
 
 
 
2004 
Constitutional 
Treaty 
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5. Conclusion: Design Lessons  
 
 Although several elements of Monnet’s original vision did not survive unaltered in the 
final Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (Griffiths, 1988), his 
achievements represent a powerful example of deliberate political design.
10 His success 
was built on an extraordinary ability to identify and exploit available spaces for institutional 
design. Although Monnet described his method based on patiently waiting for 
constitutional moments and relying on robust deontological design as “slow and 
unspectacular” (Monnet, 1978: 300), he also added in his Memoirs that: “I cannot see that 
in twenty-five years anything else has been invented as a means of uniting Europe, despite 
all temptations to desert that path” (Monnet, 1978: 432).  Despite this, the Monnet method 
has come under increasing attack, and it has been said to be of “limited use for the political 
integration and democratization of Europe” (Fischer, 2000). The Constitutional Treaty was 
in many ways a product of a process that was more open, transparent and deliberative than 
earlier reform processes at the EU level (Risse and Kleine, 2007). However, it was not the 
Convention method or the democratization of the EU that produced the negative 
                                                 
10 Monnet’s design project has also encountered criticism. Altiero Spinelli once said that 
“Monnet has the great merit of having built Europe and the great responsibility to have 
built it badly (Burgess, 1989: 55-56).  
  21referendum results in France and the Netherlands. Instead, the current ratification crisis 
must be seen in light of the designers’ neglect and/or misjudgement of the viable spaces for 
political design, as well as their ineffective approach to the exploitation of the available 
(although narrow) spaces for design. These two aspects were fundamental aspects of Jean 
Monnet as an institutional designer, as he waited patiently for constitutional moments and 
relied on robust deontological designs.  
 
The “no” to the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands has mobilized citizens 
in deliberation on the future of the EU to a larger extent than the Convention that opened in 
February 2002 and delivered its draft in July 2003 managed to do. Despite this, it is still a 
time for patience in the EU. Perhaps inspired by the designer of European post-war unity 
Jean Monnet, the Council has called for a period of reflection. Referring to the stagnation 
associated with the Presidency of De Gaulle in France and his championing of the nation-
state, Monnet wrote: “It was still a time for patience, and I had plenty of time to pursue my 
reflections to the point where I could turn them into action, which would then depend on 
circumstances (Monnet, 1978: 485).
11 Comprehensive reforms are difficult to carry out in 
practice, and the importance of patience in deliberate political and institutional design at the 
EU level must be emphasised. In the absence of constitutional moments, the EU like other 
                                                 
11 The chapter in the Memoirs that deals with the 1964-1972 period is entitled “A Time for 
Patience”. This stagnant period is part of what has been referred to as “Eurosclerosis”, and 
it has been associated with events as General de Gaulle’s “empty chair policy” and his 
continued veto against British membership.
  22polities will have to cope with tensions and disputes through routine politics rather than 
through comprehensive reforms and single comprehensive constitutive decisions (Olsen, 
2003). This has also been realized by the European Commission, which has been given a 
leading role in the public debate on the future of the EU during the current period of 
reflection. In the aftermath of the failed Constitutional Treaty, the Commission has taken a 
number of initiatives in order to simplify and better explain the EU, both key objectives 
behind the Constitutional Treaty. For instance, in September 2005, the Commission came 
up with a list of 68 legislative proposals to be scrapped as a part of the Commission’s new 
“simplification initiative” (Dinan, 2006). According to the Commission, this initiative 
should be seen as an exercise in re-regulation rather than de-regulation, which could 
contribute to dispel the notion that the EU is a “bureaucratic monster” (Verheugen, 2005). 
Thus, the EU is back to piecemeal reforms through learning and adaptation; a “slow and 
unspectacular” method that has worked well before, and that has produced spectacular 
results over a relatively short period of time.    
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